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1  Introduction 
The purpose of  this work is to critically examine macroeconomic policy in 
Mexico from 1958 to 1986. This period is of  special interest as it embodies 
two distinct, sharply contrasting phases. Between 1958 and 1972, the inflation 
rate  never exceeded 6 percent,  while annual output growth  averaged  6.7 
percent. The period since 1972, by contrast, has been marked by a succession 
of  increasingly severe macroeconomic crises.  Figures  1.1 -  1.3 depict how 
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Fig.  1.1  Growth rates of total and per capita real output, 1950-86 
Source:  Raw data are from Indicadores Econornicos (Bank  of  Mexico). 
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real output, the foreign debt, and inflation have fluctuated. Inflation and the 
foreign  debt  began  rising  rapidly  after  1972.  During  the  Echeverria 
administration the foreign debt increased fourfold to reach $28 billion, and 
in the last quarter of  1976 a major balance of  payments crisis erupted. Just 
six years later and notwithstanding an enormous increase in oil revenues, the 
foreign debt had climbed to $88 billion and the country found itself in  the 
grips of a much more threatening crisis: in  1982 the inflation rate jumped to 
98 percent, the fiscal deficit was an astounding 17.6 percent of  GDP, and 
neither the public nor the private sector was capable of meeting its scheduled 
debt service payments. 
The adjustment following the  1982 crisis has  been and  continues to  be 
traumatic. In a country that experienced continuously positive growth from 
1933 to 1981, real per capita income has fallen 13.4 percent (as of  1986) and 
real wages have declined to levels not seen since the early sixties. At the end 
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Fig. 1.2 
Source: Raw  data are  from Perspectivas Economicas de Mexico (CIEMEX- 
WHARTON), various issues. 
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Fig. 1.3  The domestic inflation rate, 1958-86 
Source: Raw data are from Indicadores Economicos (Bank of  Mexico). 
was at an historical low, and the foreign debt was $10 billion larger than in 
1982. Relations with foreign creditors remain tense; to date there have been 
three major debt reschedulings. 
In chapters 2 through 5 I analyze economic performance during the era of 
Stabilizing Development and the Echevenia, Lopez Portillo, and De La Madrid 
administrations. These chapters explore various aspects of recent macroeco- 
nomic history. They track the evolution of  economic policy  and the major 
macroeconomic variables of  interest such as real wages,  the foreign debt, 
capital flight, the fiscal deficit (broken down according to the deficits of  the 
parastatal sector, of  financial intermediaries, and of  the rest of  the govern- 
ment), and different measures of  financial intermediation. 
In the next two chapters I develop formal economic models in an attempt 
to gain some insight into the factors responsible for the dismal post-1982 
record  of  falling per capita incomes,  low  real  wages,  high  inflation, and 
widespread underemployment. Chapter 6 is an analysis of the repercussions 398  Edward F.  Buffie 
of  import  compression  on  real  wages  and  underemployment,  while  in 
chapter 7  I  investigate the  links  between  capital  accumulation,  inflation, 
fiscal deficits, and financial intermediation. 
Chapter 8 covers various topics relating to the evolution of the foreign debt, 
with a detailed discussion of the different debt reschedulings undertaken since 
1982 and  institutional aspects of  the debt management  process.  The final 
chapter briefly examines the economy’s future prospects and summarizes the 
main policy implications of  the study. 
2  The Record of 
Stabilizing Development 
After the devaluation of  the peso in  1954, the Mexican economy entered a 
phase of high growth and low inflation that would last until the end of  the 
sixties. This period has  since come to be  known as the era of  Stabilizing 
Development (SD). Though it is difficult to pinpoint its exact starting date, 
there  is  general agreement that  the  SD period  covered at  least the  years 
1958-70;  that  is,  mainly the administrations of  Presidents Adolfo L6pez 
Mateos (1959-64)  and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1965-70). 
As stated by the then Minister of Finance, Antonio Ortiz Mena, the main 
objectives of  economic policy  during  SD were  to  increase private  sector 
savings and capital accumulation, maintain price stability and a fixed parity 
with  the dollar, and  increase real  wages  (Ortiz  Mena  1970). These goals 
were largely achieved (tables 2. la and 2. lb), leading observers to speak of a 
“Mexican  miracle.”  The exchange rate  was kept  fixed  at  12.5 pesos per 
dollar, and the annual inflation rate averaged 3.8 percent. Real output grew 
at an average rate of 6.7 percent, and the share of  gross fixed investment in 
GDP rose  (at  1960 prices) from  16.2 to 20.8 percent.  The real  industrial 
sector wage inclusive of  fringe benefits grew at an annual average rate of 
roughly 4 percent.  Workers in  the urban  informal and agricultural sectors 
also appear to have experienced large real wage gains. (The data bearing on 
real wages in the latter two sectors will be discussed in section 2.3.2.) 
In the next two sections I discuss in detail the macroeconomic, trade, and 
industrial policies that constituted the SD program.’ Section 2.3 is a critical 
examination of  the conventional view that the SD strategy was responsible 
for a severe worsening in  underemployment and the distribution of  income 
and that by  1970 it could no longer deliver sustainable, high rates of growth. 